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Abstract
We present a system of relational syllogistic, based on classical proposi-
tional logic, having primitives of the following form:
Some a are R-related to some b;
Some a are R-related to all b;
All a are R-related to some b;
All a are R-related to all b.
Such primitives formalize sentences from natural language like ‘All students
read some textbooks’. Here a, b denote arbitrary sets (of objects), and R
denotes an arbitrary binary relation between objects. The language of the
logic contains only variables denoting sets, determining the class of set terms,
and variables denoting binary relations between objects, determining the class
of relational terms. Both classes of terms are closed under the standard
Boolean operations. The set of relational terms is also closed under taking the
converse of a relation. The results of the paper are the completeness theorem
with respect to the intended semantics and the computational complexity of
the satisfiability problem.
1 Introduction
It is a well-known fact that the syllogistic was the first formal theory of logic
introduced in Antiquity by Aristotle. It was presented by  Lukasiewicz in [13] as
a quantifier-free extension of propositional logic, having as atoms the expressions
A(a, b) (All a are b) and I(a, b) (Some a are b) and their negations E(a, b)
def
⇔
¬I(a, b) and O(a, b)
def
⇔ ¬A(a, b), where a, b are set (class) variables interpreted in
the natural language by noun phrases like ‘men’, ‘Greeks’, ‘mortal’. An example of
an Aristotelian syllogism taken from [13] is: “If all men are mortal and all Greeks
are men, then all Greeks are mortal”. The specific axioms for A and I from
[13] are (in a different logical notation) the following: L1. A(a, a), L2. I(a, a),
L3. A(b, c) ∧ A(a, b) → A(a, c), L4. A(b, c) ∧ I(b, a) → I(a, c). The only rules
∗A previous version of this paper has been published as [10].
1
are Modus Ponens and substitution of a set variable with another set variable.
The standard semantics of this language consists of interpreting set variables by
arbitrary non-empty sets, A(a, b) as set-inclusion a ⊆ b, and I(a, b) as the overlap
relation between sets: a ∩ b 6= ∅.
Wedberg introduced in [34] variations of the Aristotelian syllogistic with the
operation of complementation a′ on set variables interpreted as the Boolean com-
plement of the variable in a given universe. Wedberg’s system with unrestricted
interpretation on set variables is based on the following axioms (containing only A
and complementation because I(a, b) can be defined by ¬A(a, b′)): W1. A(a, a′′),
W2. A(a′′, a), W3. A(a, b) ∧ A(b, c) → A(a, c), W4. A(a, b) → A(b′, a′). W5.
A(a, a′)→ A(a, b).
Simple Henkin-style completeness and decidability proofs for  Lukasiewicz’s,
Wedberg’s and some other classical syllogistic systems were given by Shepherdson
in [32]. Shepherdson’s completeness proofs are based on the notion of partially
ordered set S with an operation of complementation ‘′’ satisfying the following
axioms for all a, b ∈ S: a′′ = a, a ≤ b → b′ ≤ a′, and a ≤ a′ → a ≤ b. Similar
structures are now known as orthoposets (see [20]). Shepherdson also mentioned in
[32] systems containing not only complementation on set terms, but also Boolean
intersection.
We call the variations of Aristotelian syllogistic, mentioned above, classical
syllogistics. All such logics are based on propositional logic, but weaker systems,
which do not contain the propositional connectives or contain only negation, have
also been considered in the literature. For instance, Moss in [19, 20], motivated
mainly with applications of syllogistics to natural languages, considers various syl-
logistics of classical type, based on languages containing primitives like A, I,E,O
with or without complementation on set variables. The corresponding axiomatic
systems are based on a number of inference rules with finite sets of atomic premises.
For a long time classical syllogistic has been considered only in introductory
courses on elementary logic. Nowadays, however, syllogistic theories, extended and
modified in various ways, find applications in different areas, mainly in natural
language theory [15, 19, 20, 21, 22, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 31, 33], computer science
and artificial intelligence [3, 17, 11, 23], generalized quantifiers [35], argumentation
theory [24], cognitive psychology [12, 25] and others (the list of references is fairly
incomplete). Most of the extended syllogistics generalize the standard syllogistic
relations A(a, b), I(a, b), E(a, b) and O(a, b) using in their definitions various non-
standard quantifiers arising from natural language. Examples: ‘At least 5 a are
b’, ‘Exactly 5 a are b’, ‘Most a are b’, ‘All except 2 a are not b’, ‘Many a are not
b’, ‘Only a few a are not b’, ‘Usually some a are not b’, etc.
Some of the relations between sets a and b are determined by certain relations
between their members, expressible by some verbs or verb phrases in the natural
language. Examples: ‘All students read some textbooks’, ‘Some people don’t like
any cat’, ‘Some vegetarians eat some fish’, ‘All vegetarians don’t like any meat’,
‘At least 5 students read all textbooks’, etc. Syllogistics studying such expressions
are called by Moss and Pratt-Hartmann [31, 28] relational syllogistics.
Aristotelian syllogistic and most of its extensions can be considered as logics
which fit the structure of natural language. Their primitives like All A are B,
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Some A are B, Most A are B etc, can be considered as relations between classes
(sets of objects), and in this sense syllogistic theories can be treated as certain
special theories of classes. On the other hand such primitives express kinds of
quantification studied in the theory of generalized quantifiers [4, 35]. Combining
some features from generalized quantifier theory and syllogistic reasoning, a new
trend in logic has been developed in recent years, called natural logic, or logic for
natural language with the aim to study logical formalisms which fit well with the
structure of natural language (see, for instance, [16] and [6] for other references).
In this paper we introduce a quite rich system of relational syllogistic combining
some semantical ideas from the aforementioned papers on relational syllogistics
and some technical ideas from [1, 2]. The language of the logic is similar to
the language of Dynamic Logic and contains both set variables and relational
variables from which we construct complex terms. Both classes of terms are closed
with respect to all Boolean operations while on relational terms we also have
the operation ‘−1’ of taking the converse. We have five atomic predicates from
which we construct the set of formulas using the propositional connectives: a ≤ b,
∃∃(a, b)[α], ∀∃(a, b)[α], ∃∀(a, b)[α], ∀∀(a, b)[α]. Here a, b are set terms and α is
a relational term. The semantical structures are the same as in Dynamic logic
(W,R, v), where R is a mapping from relational variables to the set of binary
relations on W and v is a mapping which assigns to each set variable a subset of
W . The semantics of ∀∃(a, b)[α] is the following:
(W,R, v)  ∀∃(a, b)[α] iff
(
∀x ∈ v(a)
)(
∃y ∈ v(b)
)(
xR(α)y
)
.
The semantics of the remaining atomic formulas is analogous. Linguistically these
formulas cover the examples like ‘All students read some textbooks’, taking all
combinations of ‘some’ and ‘all’, considering subject wide scope reading. Having
the operation α−1, we may also express in our language the object wide scope
reading (see [21] for more details). By means of the Boolean operations on rela-
tional terms we may express “compound verbs” like ‘to read but not to write’.
Also by ‘−1’ we may express the passive voice of the verbs like ‘is read’. Similarly
by means of Boolean operators on set terms we may express compound nouns.
Let us note that the signs ∃∀ in ∃∀(a, b)[α], and similarly in the other primitives,
are not quantifiers on set or relational variables, but part of the notation of our
primitive sentences. We choose this notation just because it corresponds directly
to the semantics of these primitives and in this way helps the reader to catch more
easily their meaning.
We present a Hilbert-style axiomatic system for the logic based on the axioms
of propositional logic, Modus Ponens and several additional finitary inference rules
satisfying some syntactic restrictions. The list of axioms contains the finite list of
axiom schemes for Boolean algebra plus a finite list of axiom schemes for the basic
predicates. In this sense our logic is a quantifier-free first-order system, based
on propositional logic. We will not treat in this paper our primitive relations as
generalized quantifiers.
Logics with similar rules, which in a sense imitate quantification, and canonical
constructions for corresponding completeness proofs are studied in [1, 2]. We adopt
and modify these canonical techniques. There are, however, new difficulties, which
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have no analogs in [1, 2]. That is why we need to combine canonical constructions
from [1, 2] with a modification of a copying construction from [5, 7, 8]. The
formulas of our logic have a translation into Boolean Modal Logic (BML) [5, 7]
extended with converse on relational terms. We obtain that the complexity of
the satisfiability problem for the logic is the same as the complexity of BML [14],
i.e. NExpTime if the language contains an infinite number of relational variables,
and ExpTime if only a finite number of relational variables is available.
The present paper is an extended version of the first author’s master’s thesis
[9] and was inspired by [31], especially by the presentation of [31] by Moss as an
invited lecture at the Conference “Advances in Modal Logic 2008” [18].
The paper is organized as follows.
In section 2, we introduce the language and semantics of our logic.
In section 3, we list the axioms and inference rules of our logical system. We
use the axioms for the contact relation from [1] and some additional axioms and
inference rules which essentially imitate quantifiers in our quantifier-free language.
In section 4, we prove the completeness of our axiomatic system. The proof
uses some ideas from the completeness proofs for modal logics of the contact
relation [1] and BML [5, 7].
In section 5, we discuss the complexity of the satisfiability problem for the
logic under consideration and some of its fragments.
2 Syntax and semantics
2.1 Language
The language consists of the following sets of symbols:
(1) an infinite set VS of set variables;
(2) the set constants 0 and 1;
(3) a non-empty set VR of relational variables such that VR ∩VS = ∅;
(4) relational constants 0R and 1R;
(5) functional symbols ∩, ∪ and − for the operations meet, join and complement;
(6) functional symbol −1;
(7) relational symbols ≤, ∃∃, ∀∃, ∀∀, ∃∀;
(8) propositional connectives ∧,∨,¬,→,↔;
(9) propositional constants ⊥ and ⊤;
(10) the symbols ‘(’, ‘)’, ‘[’, ‘]’, ‘,’.
As the language is uniquely determined by the pair (VS,VR), we will also call
(VS,VR) a language. In the first two sections we will keep the language fixed.
Set terms are built from the set constants and set variables by means of the
Boolean connectives ∩, ∪ and −. If V ⊆ VS, we will denote by TSet(V ) the set of
all set terms with variables from V .
We define the set of relational terms TRel(X) with variables in X ⊆ VR to be
the smallest set such that:
(1) X ∪ {0R, 1R} ⊆ TRel(X);
(2) If α ∈ TRel(X) then
{
−α,α−1
}
⊆ TRel(X);
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(3) If {α, β} ⊆ TRel(X) then {α ∩ β, α ∪ β} ⊆ TRel(X).
Atomic formulas have one of the forms
a ≤ b ∃∃(a, b)[α] ∀∃(a, b)[α] ∀∀(a, b)[α] ∃∀(a, b)[α] ,
where a and b are set terms and α is a relational term. Formulas are built from
atomic formulas by means of the propositional connectives. We will abbreviate
(a ≤ b) ∧ (b ≤ a) as a = b and its negation as a 6= b. If V ⊆ VS and R ⊆ VR, we
will denote by Form(V,R) the set of all formulas with set variables from the set
V and relational variables from R.
2.2 Semantics
LetW be a set and let R : VR → P(W
2) and v : VS → P(W ) be two functions
1. R
is a valuation of the relational variables, which maps every relational variable to a
relation on W . The valuation v of the set variables maps set variables to subsets
of W . We will call the pair (W,R) a frame and the triple (W,R, v) a model. The
set W is called the domain of that frame or model.
We extend the function R to the set of all relational terms by defining R(0R) =
∅ and R(1R) = W
2 and interpreting the symbols ∩, ∪, − and −1 by intersection,
union, complement in W 2 and taking the converse of the relations on W . We
extend the function v to the set of all set terms analogously.
IfM is a model and ϕ is a formula, we will denote the statement that ϕ is true
in M by M  ϕ. We define the truth and falsity of atomic formulas in a model
(W,R, v) by the following equivalences:
(W,R, v)  a ≤ b⇔ v(a) ⊆ v(b)
(W,R, v)  ∃∃(a, b)[α]⇔
(
∃x ∈ v(a)
)(
∃y ∈ v(b)
)(
(x, y) ∈ R(α)
)
(W,R, v)  ∀∃(a, b)[α]⇔
(
∀x ∈ v(a)
)(
∃y ∈ v(b)
)(
(x, y) ∈ R(α)
)
(W,R, v)  ∀∀(a, b)[α]⇔
(
∀x ∈ v(a)
)(
∀y ∈ v(b)
)(
(x, y) ∈ R(α)
)
(W,R, v)  ∃∀(a, b)[α]⇔
(
∃x ∈ v(a)
)(
∀y ∈ v(b)
)(
(x, y) ∈ R(α)
)
.
The definition is extended to the set of all formulas according to the standard
meaning of the propositional connectives.
2.3 Relations with natural language semantics
Linguistically the relational variables are interpreted as transitive verbs, and the
set variables – as count-nouns. The formulas a ≤ b and a ∩ b 6= ∅ mean ‘Every a
is a b’ and ‘Some a is a b’ respectively. To illustrate the meaning of the symbols
Q1Q2, let us interpret a as ‘man’, b as ‘animal’, and α as the verb ‘to like’. We
denote the subject wide scope reading and the object wide scope reading of a
sentence . . . by (. . . )sws and (. . . )ows respectively.
2 Then we have the following
meanings:
1We denote by P(X) the power set of the set X.
2If the two readings are equivalent, we omit the annotation.
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∃∃(a, b)[α] means Some man likes some animal
∀∀(a, b)[α] means Every man likes every animal
∀∃(a, b)[α] means (Every man likes some animal)sws
∃∀(a, b)[α] means (Some man likes every animal)sws.
To express the object wide scope reading, we need the symbol −1 which con-
verts a verb into passive voice. In our example α−1 means ‘to be liked’:
∀∃(b, a)[α−1] means (Some man likes every animal)ows
∃∀(b, a)[α−1] means (Every man likes some animal)ows.
Boolean connectives in set terms formalize negated nouns and the connectives
‘and’ and ‘or’ between nouns. The presence of Boolean operators in relational
terms allows us to formalize natural language sentences, which contain negated
verbs, as well as compound predicates, such as ‘sees and hears’ (see ∩ hear) and
‘sees, but is not seen’ (see ∩ (−see−1)).
3 Axioms and inference rules
We will use the following notation: If A is a formula or a term, then VSet(A)
denotes the set of set variables which occur in A. Also, VSet(A1, . . . , An) =⋃n
i=1VSet(Ai).
The idea behind the list of axioms is the following. Since ∃∃ is the contact
relation from the modal logics of region-based theories of space [1], we use the
same set of axioms for it. The truth of each of the other three relations Q1Q2 is
linked to the truth of ∃∃ by the following equivalences:
(W,R, v)  ∀∃(a, b)[α]
⇔
(
∀p ⊆W
)(
v(a) ∩ p = ∅ ∨
(
∃x ∈ p
)(
∃y ∈ v(b)
)(
(x, y) ∈ R(α)
))
(W,R, v)  ∀∀(a, b)[α]
⇔
(
∀p ⊆W
)(
v(b) ∩ p = ∅ ∨
(
∀x ∈ v(a)
)(
∃y ∈ p
)(
(x, y) ∈ R(α)
))
(W,R, v)  ¬∃∀(a, b)[α]
⇔
(
∀p ⊆W
)(
v(a) ∩ p = ∅ ∨ ¬
(
∀x ∈ p
)(
∀y ∈ v(b)
)(
(x, y) ∈ R(α)
))
These equivalences express the following simple statement. If ϕ(x) is a prop-
erty of elements x in some set W and A ⊆W , then (∀x ∈ A)ϕ(x) is equivalent to
(∀X ⊆W )
(
X ∩A 6= ∅ ⇒ (∃x ∈ X)ϕ(x)
)
.
Thus, we expressed the universally quantified property (∀x ∈ A)ϕ(x) by the
existentially quantified property (∃x ∈ X)ϕ(x) and a quantification over sets.
Substituting the appropriate formulas in the place of ϕ(x), we get the above
equivalences.
The left-to-right direction of each of these equivalences is a universal formula.
We add it to the set of axioms. These are the axioms (AL1), (AL2), (AL3) in the
list below. We call them linking axioms, because they link relation symbols Q1Q2
and Q′1Q
′
2, which differ in the first or second quantifier.
The right-to-left directions of the equivalences are not universal formulas. Since
we do not have quantifiers in our language, we cannot write these conditions as
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axioms. Instead, we imitate them by inference rules with a special variable, corre-
sponding to the quantified variable p in the above equivalences, using a technique
from [1]. These are the rules (R1), (R2), (R3) from the list below. We call them
linking rules.
We will also use a rule whose only purpose is to derive all formulas of the form
a 6= 0→ ∃∃(a, a)
[
(α−11 ∪ −α1) ∩ (α
−1
2 ∪ −α2) ∩ · · · ∩ (α
−1
k ∪ −αk)
]
.
These formulas state that the valuation of any relational term of the form α−1 ∪
(−α) must be reflexive. The fact that they are theorems is proved in Lemma 4.10
and is used in Proposition 4.15.
The set of axioms consists of the following groups of formulas:
(1) A sound and complete set of axiom schemes for propositional calculus;
(2) A set of axioms for Boolean algebra in terms of the relation ≤;
(3) Axioms for equality:
Q1Q2(a, b)[α] ∧ a = c→ Q1Q2(c, b)[α] (A
=
1 )
Q1Q2(a, b)[α] ∧ b = c→ Q1Q2(a, c)[α] (A
=
2 )
(4) Axioms for ∃∃:
a = 0 ∨ b = 0→ ¬∃∃(a, b)[α] (A0)
∃∃(a ∪ b, c)[α]↔ ∃∃(a, c)[α] ∨ ∃∃(b, c)[α] (A∪1 )
∃∃(a, b ∪ c)[α]↔ ∃∃(a, b)[α] ∨ ∃∃(a, c)[α] (A∪2 )
(5) Linking axioms:
∀∃(a, b)[α]→ a ∩ c = 0 ∨ ∃∃(c, b)[α] (AL1)
∀∀(a, b)[α]→ b ∩ c = 0 ∨ ∀∃(a, c)[α] (AL2)
¬∃∀(a, b)[α]→ a ∩ c = 0 ∨ ¬∀∀(c, b)[α] (AL3)
(6) Axioms for 0R and 1R:
¬∃∃(a, b)[0R] (A0R)
∀∀(a, b)[1R] (A1R)
(7) Axioms for ∩, ∪, − and −1 in relational terms:
∀∀(a, b)[α ∩ β]↔ ∀∀(a, b)[α] ∧ ∀∀(a, b)[β] (A∩)
∃∃(a, b)[α ∪ β]↔ ∃∃(a, b)[α] ∨ ∃∃(a, b)[β] (A∪)
∀∀(a, b)[−α]↔ ¬∃∃(a, b)[α] (A−)
∃∃(a, b)[α−1]↔ ∃∃(b, a)[α] (A−1)
Inference rules:
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(1)
ϕ,ϕ→ ψ ⊢ ψ (MP )
(2) Special rules imitating quantifiers: If p ∈ VS \VSet(ϕ, a, b) then
ϕ→ a ∩ p = 0 ∨ ∃∃(p, b)[α] ⊢ ϕ→ ∀∃(a, b)[α] (R1)
ϕ→ b ∩ p = 0 ∨ ∀∃(a, p)[α] ⊢ ϕ→ ∀∀(a, b)[α] (R2)
ϕ→ a ∩ p = 0 ∨ ¬∀∀(p, b)[α] ⊢ ϕ→ ¬∃∀(a, b)[α] (R3)
a ∩ p = 0 ∨ ∃∃(p, p)[α] ⊢ a = 0 ∨ ∃∃(a, a)
[
α ∩ (β−1 ∪ −β)
]
(RS)
The variable p is called the special variable of the rule.
The notions of proof and theorem are defined in the standard way. We will
denote by Thm(VS,VR) the set of all theorems in the language (VS,VR).
Proposition 3.1. All theorems are true in all models.
Proof. All axioms are true in all models and the rule of MP preserves truth in each
model. Each of the special rules preserves validity in each frame, that is: if the
premise is true in all valuations on a given frame, then so is the conclusion.
To illustrate the proof system, we will show a proof of the formula
∃∀(a, b)[α]→ ∀∃(b, a)[α−1] .
Let p, q ∈ VS, p 6= q and {p, q} ∩VSet(a, b) = ∅.
⊢¬∀∀(p, b)[α] ∨ b ∩ q = 0 ∨ ∀∃(p, q)[α] by (AL2)
⊢¬∀∀(p, b)[α] ∨ b ∩ q = 0 ∨ p ∩ a = 0 ∨ ∃∃(a, q)[α] by (AL1)
⊢a ∩ p = 0 ∨ ¬∀∀(p, b)[α] ∨ b ∩ q = 0 ∨ ∃∃(q, a)[α−1] by (A−1)
⊢¬∃∀(a, b)[α] ∨ ∀∃(b, a)[α−1] by (R3) and (R1)
4 Completeness
4.1 Plan of the completeness proof
First we review the definition of theories and the construction of maximal theo-
ries from consistent sets of formulas in the presence of special rules of inference,
which imitate quantifiers (for details, see [1]). We do not have bound variables in
formulas, but we will think of some of the variables as being bound by universal
quantifiers. That is why we define a theory as a set of formulas together with a
set of unbound variables. The set of formulas will not be closed under arbitrary
applications of the special rules, but only under applications of instances of these
rules, in which the special variable is among the universally bound variables.
To build a model of a consistent set of formulas, we first need to extend it
into a maximal thery. We require that such theories contain for each formula
exactly one of the formula itself or its negation, but we also require an analog of
Henkin’s condition – if the theory contains the negation of the conclusion of some
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instance of a special rule (which is existential), it should also contain a negation
of the premise of that rule (for some special variable, which may be thought of as
a witness for that existential formula).
Our construction of the canonical model is based on the Stone representation
theorem for Boolean algebras. It builds the points in the model as ultrafilters in
the Boolean algebra of set terms. This gives us the correct interpretation of the
Boolean operators on set terms without further effort. The problem is that we
do not obtain automatically the intended interpretation of the Boolean operators
on relational terms. We explain how we deal with this problem in subsection 4.4,
after we introduce the necessary notation.
4.2 Theories
Definition 1. Let Γ ⊆ Form(VS,VR) and ϕ ∈ Form(VS,VR). We will write
Γ ⊢0 ϕ when there is a proof of ϕ from Γ, which does not use the special rules
(that is, a proof using only (MP )). Γ is called consistent if Γ∪Thm(VS,VR) 00 ⊥.
Definition 2 (Theory). Let Γ ⊆ Form(VS,VR) and let V ⊆ VS. We say that
the pair (V,Γ) is a theory in the language (VS,VR) when the following conditions
hold:
(1) Thm(VS,VR) ⊆ Γ;
(2) If ϕ,ϕ→ ψ ∈ Γ then ψ ∈ Γ;
(3) Let P (q) be a premise of a linking rule, where q ∈ VS is the special variable
of the rule. Let C be the conclusion of that rule, q ∈ VS \
(
V ∪VSet(C)
)
and
P (q) ∈ Γ. Then C ∈ Γ.
We say that the theory (V,Γ) is consistent if ⊥ /∈ Γ.
We say that the theory (V,Γ) in the language (VS,VR) is a good theory if
|V | < |VS|.
The theory (V,Γ) is called complete if it is consistent and for each formula ϕ
in its language we have either ϕ ∈ Γ or ¬ϕ ∈ Γ.
The theory (V,Γ) in the language (VS,VR) is called rich if for each linking rule
with premise P (q) ∈ Form(VS,VR) and conclusion C the following implication
holds: C /∈ Γ ⇒ (∃q ∈ VS)
(
P (q) /∈ Γ
)
. (The conclusion C uniquely determines
P (q) up to a substitution of q with another set variable.)
Lemma 4.1. For every consistent set of formulas Γ0 there exists a consistent
theory T = (V,Γ) with Γ ⊇ Γ0.
Proof. Let T =
(
VS,
{
ϕ ∈ Form(VS,VR)
∣∣ Γ0 ∪ Thm(VS,VR) ⊢0 ϕ}).
Notation. We define a relation ⊆ between theories in the same language:
(V1,Γ1) ⊆ (V2,Γ2)
def
⇔ V1 ⊆ V2 ∧ Γ1 ⊆ Γ2 .
We will write ϕ ∈ (V,Γ) if ϕ ∈ Γ.
We fix a language (VS,VR) and introduce the following notation:
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Notation. If Γ is a set of formulas and ϕ is a formula,
Γ + ϕ
def
=
{
ψ ∈ Form(VS,VR)
∣∣ ϕ→ ψ ∈ Γ} .
If T = (V,Γ) is a theory and ϕ is a formula,
T ⊕ ϕ
def
=
(
V ∪VSet(ϕ),Γ + ϕ
)
.
Lemma 4.2. If T = (V,Γ) is a good theory and ϕ is a formula then:
(1) T ⊕ ϕ is a good theory, T ⊆ T ⊕ ϕ and ϕ ∈ T ⊕ ϕ;
(2) T ⊕ ϕ is inconsistent ⇔ ¬ϕ ∈ Γ;
(3) If P (q) and C are the premise and conclusion of a linking rule and the theory
T ⊕ ¬C is consistent, then there is a set variable q ∈ VS \
(
V ∪ VSet(C)
)
,
such that T ⊕ ¬C ⊕ ¬P (q)
)
is a good consistent theory.
Proof. Straightforward verification.
Lemma 4.3 (Lindenbaum). Every good consistent theory T0 = (V0,Γ0) in a lan-
guage (VS,VR) with |VR| ≤ |VS| is contained in a complete rich theory T = (V,Γ).
Proof. Let T0 = (V0,Γ0) be a good consistent theory. Let κ = |VS| and let
Form(VS,VR) = {ϕα|α < κ}. We will build a sequence of theories {Tα}α<κ with
the following properties:
(1) Tα is a good consistent theory;
(2) ¬ϕα ∈ Tα or ϕα ∈ Tα+1;
(3) If ϕα ∈ Tα+1, ϕα = ¬C and C is the conclusion of a linking rule, then there
is a set variable q, such that the negated premise of the rule ¬P (q) belongs
to Tα+1.
Suppose that Tβ have been defined for β < α. We will define Tα. We consider the
following cases:
(1) α = β + 1 for some β and Tβ = (Vβ ,Γβ) has already been defined. We need
to consider two possibilities for the theory Tβ ⊕ ϕβ:
(a) Tβ ⊕ ϕβ is consistent. We have two cases depending on ϕβ :
i. ϕβ does not have the form of a negated conclusion of a linking rule.
In this case we define Tα = Tβ ⊕ ϕβ .
ii. ϕβ = ¬C and C is a conclusion of a linking rule. Let P (q) be
the premise of that rule. According to Lemma 4.2 there is a set
variable q ∈ VS \
(
Vβ ∪ VSet(ϕβ)
)
such that Tβ ⊕ ϕβ ⊕ ¬P (q) is
a good consistent theory. We choose such a variable q and define
Tα = Tβ ⊕ ϕβ ⊕ ¬P (q).
(b) Tβ ⊕ ϕβ is inconsistent. Then Lemma 4.2 tells us that ¬ϕβ ∈ Γβ. We
define Tα = Tβ.
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(2) α =
⋃
α. We define Vα =
⋃
{Vβ |β < α}, Γα =
⋃
{Γβ |β < α} and Tα =
(Vα,Γα).
It is easy to verify the three properties of Tα stated above by induction on
α. We define V =
⋃
{Vα|α < κ}, Γ =
⋃
{Γα|α < κ} and T = (V,Γ). By the
properties of Tα for α < κ it easily follows that T is a complete rich theory.
The Lindenbaum lemma is only applicable to good theories. That is why we
will also need the following lemma:
Lemma 4.4. Let T0 = (V,Γ0) be a consistent theory in a language (VS0,VR) and
let VS ⊇ VS0 with |VS| > |VS0| be an extension of VS0 with a set VS \VS0 of new
set variables. Then there is a good consistent theory T = (VS0,Γ) in the language
(VS,VR) such that Γ0 ⊆ Γ.
Proof. Define
Γ =
{
ϕ ∈ Form(VS,VR)
∣∣ (∃ψ ∈ Γ0)(ψ → ϕ ∈ Thm(VS,VR))} .
It is straightforward to check that T = (VS0,Γ) has the desired properties.
Corollary 4.5. (1) Every consistent set of formulas is contained in a good con-
sistent theory in an extension of the language with a set of new set variables.
(2) Every consistent set of formulas is contained in a complete rich theory in an
extension of the language with a set of new set variables.
A complete rich theory is also called a maximal theory.
4.3 Boolean algebras of classes of terms
Let S be a maximal theory. We will associate with S some equivalence relations
in TSet(VS) and TRel(VR) and will show that the equivalence classes form Boolean
algebras with respect to some naturally defined operations.
4.3.1 The Boolean algebra of classes of set terms
We will associate with S a Boolean algebra of classes of set terms. We define the
relations 4 and ≈ on TSet(VS):
a 4 b
def
⇔ a ≤ b ∈ S a ≈ b
def
⇔ (a 4 b ∧ b 4 a) .
The relation ≈ is an equivalence relation. We denote by [a] the equivalence class
of a. We denote by ClS the set of all equivalence classes. We define a relation ≤
on ClS: [a] ≤ [b]
def
⇔ a 4 b. We define the operations ∩, ∪ and − on ClS:
[a] ∩ [b]
def
= [a ∩ b] [a] ∪ [b]
def
= [a ∪ b] −[a]
def
= [−a] .
The relation ≤ and the operations ∩, ∪ and − are well-defined. The six-tuple(
ClS,∩,∪,−, [0], [1]
)
is a Boolean algebra.
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4.3.2 The Boolean algebra of classes of relational terms
We define the relations 4 and ≈ on the set of all relational terms:
α 4 β
def
⇔
(
∀a, b ∈ TSet(VS)
)(
∃∃(a, b)[α]→ ∃∃(a, b)[β] ∈ S
)
α ≈ β
def
⇔ (α 4 β ∧ β 4 α) .
The intuition behind this definition is that in every model (W,R, v) of S the
following implication must hold for arbitrary relational terms α and β: α 4 β ⇒
R(α) ⊆ R(β).
The relation ≈ is an equivalence relation. We denote by [α] the equivalence
class of α. We denote by ClR the set of all equivalence classes. We define a relation
≤ on ClR: [α] ≤ [β]
def
⇔ α 4 β. We define the operations ∩, ∪, − and −1 on ClR:
[α] ∩ [β]
def
= [α ∩ β] [α] ∪ [β]
def
= [α ∪ β]
−[α]
def
= [−α] [α]−1
def
= [α−1] .
Proposition 4.6. The relation ≤ and the operations ∩, ∪, − and −1 on ClR are
well-defined. The six-tuple (ClR,∩,∪,−, [0R], [1R]) is a Boolean algebra and for
arbitrary relational terms α and β we have the equivalence α 4 β ⇔ α ∪ β ≈ β.
Proof. See Appendix A.
Lemma 4.7. [1] ≤ [0]⇔ [1R] ≤ [0R].
Proof. (→) Let 1 = 0 ∈ S and a, b ∈ TSet(VS). Then a = 0 ∈ S and b = 0 ∈ S.
By (A0), ¬∃∃(a, b)[1R] ∈ S, and hence
∃∃(a, b)[1R]→ ∃∃(a, b)[0R] ∈ S .
(←) Assume that [1R] ≤ [0R]. Then
∃∃(1, 1)[1R]→ ∃∃(1, 1)[0R] ∈ S .
By (A0R), ¬∃∃(1, 1)[0R] ∈ S, and hence ¬∃∃(1, 1)[1R] ∈ S.
By (A1R), ∀∀(1, 1)[1R] ∈ S, hence ∀∀(1, 1)[1R] ∧ ¬∃∃(1, 1)[1R] ∈ S.
Using (AL1) and (AL2), we conclude that 1 = 0 ∈ S.
4.3.3 The Boolean algebra of symmetric classes of relational terms
We define an operation −1 on P(ClR): For each V ⊆ ClR
V −1
def
=
{
[α]−1
∣∣ [α] ∈ V } .
Lemma 4.8. (1) If α ∈ TRel(VR) then
(
α−1
)−1
≈ α.
(2) If x ∈ ClR then
(
x−1
)−1
= x. If V ⊆ ClR then
(
V −1
)−1
= V .
(3) Let V ⊆ ClR. If V is a filter, then so is V
−1. If V is an ultrafilter, then so
is V −1.
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We will call x ∈ ClR symmetric if x = x
−1. Similarly, we will call V ⊆ ClR
symmetric if V = V −1.
Lemma 4.9. The set of symmetric classes of relational terms is a Boolean sub-
algebra of (ClR,∩,∪,−, [0R], [1R]).
Lemma 4.10. If a is a set term and α1, α2, . . . , αk are relational terms, then the
formula a = 0 ∨ ∃∃(a, a)
[
(α−11 ∪ −α1) ∩ (α
−1
2 ∪ −α2) ∩ · · · ∩ (α
−1
k ∪ −αk)
]
is a
theorem.
Proof. Let p1, p2, . . . , pk be different set variables, which do not occur in a. By
(A1R), (AL2) and (AL1), we have
⊢ p1 ∩ · · · ∩ pk ∩ a = 0 ∨ ∃∃(p1 ∩ · · · ∩ pk ∩ a, p1 ∩ · · · ∩ pk ∩ a)[1R]
⊢ p1 ∩ · · · ∩ pk ∩ a = 0 ∨ ∃∃(p1, p1)[1R] by item 1 in Lemma A.3
⊢ p2 ∩ · · · ∩ pk ∩ a = 0
∨ ∃∃(p2 ∩ · · · ∩ pk ∩ a, p2 ∩ · · · ∩ pk ∩ a)
[
α−11 ∪ −α1
]
by (RS)
Similarly we obtain
⊢ p2 ∩ · · · ∩ pk ∩ a = 0 ∨ ∃∃(p2, p2)
[
α−11 ∪ −α1
]
⊢ p3 ∩ · · · ∩ pk ∩ a = 0
∨ ∃∃(p3 ∩ · · · ∩ pk ∩ a, p3 ∩ · · · ∩ pk ∩ a)
[
(α−11 ∪ −α1) ∩ (α
−1
2 ∪ −α2)
]
Continuing in the same way, we arrive at
⊢ a = 0 ∨ ∃∃(a, a)
[
(α−11 ∪ −α1) ∩ (α
−1
2 ∪ −α2) ∩ · · · ∩ (α
−1
k ∪ −αk)
]
.
4.4 Canonical construction
Let S be a maximal theory. We will prove that S has a model.
We denote by M∅ the model
(
∅,VR × {∅},VS × {∅}
)
.
Lemma 4.11. If S is a maximal theory and 1 = 0 ∈ S, then M∅  S.
Proof. As S is a maximal theory, it suffices to prove the equivalence
M∅  ϕ⇔ ϕ ∈ S
for atomic formulas ϕ.
(1) Clearly, all formulas in the form of a ≤ b belong to S and are true in M∅.
(2) ϕ is ∃∃(a, b)[α]. Then M∅ 2 ϕ. By (A0) ϕ /∈ S.
(3) ϕ is ∀∃(a, b)[α]. Then M∅  ϕ. For the sake of contradiction suppose that
ϕ /∈ S. There exists a set variable p for which
a ∩ p = 0 ∨ ∃∃(p, b)[α] /∈ S .
This is a contradiction, since a ∩ p = 0 ∈ S.
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(4) ϕ is ∀∀(a, b)[α] or ∃∀(a, b)[α]. Follows from the above and Lemma A.1.
We will now consider the case when 1 = 0 /∈ S.
We denote by UltS the set of ultrafilters of the Boolean algebra(
ClS,∩,∪,−, [0], [1]
)
.
Similarly, we denote by UltR the set of ultrafilters of the Boolean algebra
(ClR,∩,∪,−, [0R], [1R]) .
Since [1]  [0], the set UltS is non-empty. By Lemma 4.7, we have also UltR 6= ∅.
If Q is a quantifier and F (a) is a statement about set terms, such that a ≈
b implies F (a) ⇔ F (b), we will use
(
Q[a] ∈ ClS
)
F (a) as an abbreviation for
(Qx ∈ ClS)(∃a ∈ x)F (a). We will also use a similar notation for statements about
relational terms.
Notation. If a ∈ TSet(VS), we denote by [a) =
{
x ∈ ClS
∣∣ [a] ≤ x} the smallest
filter containing [a]. Similarly, if α ∈ TRel(VR), we denote by [α) =
{
x ∈ ClR
∣∣
[α] ≤ x
}
the smallest filter containing [α].
We will explain the ideas which lead us to the definition of the canonical model
of S. We may attempt to define the model as M0 = (W0, R0, v0), where:
(1) W0 = UltS;
(2) For each relational term α let
R0(α) =
{
(U1, U2) ∈ UltS
2
∣∣∣(
∀[a1] ∈ U1
)(
∀[a2] ∈ U2
)(
∃∃(a1, a2)[α] ∈ S
)}
;
(3) For each set variable p let v0(p) = {x ∈W0|[p] ∈ x}.
Then, for arbitrary set terms a, b and an arbitrary relational term α we have:
a ≤ b ∈ S ⇔ v0(a) ⊆ v0(b)
Q1Q2(a, b)[α] ∈ S ⇔
(
Q1x ∈ v(a)
)(
Q2y ∈ v(b)
)(
(x, y) ∈ R0(α)
)
.
There is, however, a problem with this model. The function R0 may not follow the
correct semantics of the Boolean operators – we do not necessarily have R0(α∩β) =
R0(α) ∩ R0(β) and R0(α) ∩ R0(−α) = ∅. To build the canonical model, we first
define a relation R0V onW0 for each relational ultrafilter V , such that the valuation
of each relational term α inM0 will be a union of such relations. For each V ⊆ ClR
we define a relation R0V ⊆ P(ClS)
2:
R0V =
{
(U1, U2) ∈ P(ClS)
2
∣∣∣(
∀[α] ∈ V
)(
∀[a1] ∈ U1
)(
∀[a2] ∈ U2
)(
∃∃(a1, a2)[α] ∈ S
)}
.
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Now for each α ∈ TRel(VR) we have:
R0(α) =W
2
0 ∩
⋃{
R0V
∣∣ V ∈ UltR ∧ [α] ∈ V } .
We should replace R0V with another relation RV defined for each V ∈ UltR, such
that RV ′ ∩ RV ′′ = ∅ for different V
′, V ′′ ∈ UltR. The universe of our model
will consist of a number of copies of W0. If (x, y) ∈ R
0
V ′ ∩ R
0
V ′′ for different
V ′, V ′′ ∈ UltR, we will have some copies x
′, x′′ of x and some copies y′, y′′ of y,
such that (x′, y′) ∈ RV ′ and (x
′′, y′′) ∈ RV ′′ .
Notation. Let F1 and F2 be filters in the Boolean algebra of ClS and let G be a
filter in the Boolean algebra of ClR. We will use the following notation:
IF1,F2 =
{
[α] ∈ ClR
∣∣∣ (∃[a1] ∈ F1)(∃[a2] ∈ F2)(∃∃(a1, a2)[α] /∈ S)}
IG,F2 =
{
[a1] ∈ ClS
∣∣∣ (∃[α] ∈ G)(∃[a2] ∈ F2)(∃∃(a1, a2)[α] /∈ S)}
IF1,G =
{
[a2] ∈ ClS
∣∣∣ (∃[a1] ∈ F1)(∃[α] ∈ G)(∃∃(a1, a2)[α] /∈ S)}
It is easy to check that the I’s are ideals in the respective Boolean algebras.
Lemma 4.12. Let F1 and F2 be filters in the Boolean algebra of ClS and let G be a
filter in the Boolean algebra of ClR. If (F1, F2) ∈ R
0
G, then there are U1, U2 ∈ UltS
and V ∈ UltR such that F1 ⊆ U1, F2 ⊆ U2, G ⊆ V and (U1, U2) ∈ R
0
V .
Proof. We use the equivalences
(F1, F2) ∈ R
0
G ⇔ F1 ∩ IG,F2 = ∅ ⇔ G ∩ IF1,F2 = ∅ ⇔ F2 ∩ IF1,G = ∅
and apply the separation theorem for filter-ideal pairs in Boolean algebras three
times.
Let us first exclude the symbol −1 from the language. To construct the relations
RV , we need the following lemma:
Lemma 4.13. Let (U1, U2) ∈ UltS
2. Then:
(1) (U1, U2) ∈ R
0
[1R)
.
(2) There is a V ∈ UltR such that (U1, U2) ∈ R
0
V .
Proof. (1) Suppose this is not true. Since S is a complete theory,(
∃[a1] ∈ U1
)(
∃[a2] ∈ U2
)(
¬∃∃(a1, a2)[1R] ∈ S
)
.
By the axiom for 1R, ∀∀(a1, a2)[1R] ∈ S. Using the linking axioms, we derive
a1 = 0∨a2 = 0 ∈ S. Since S is a complete theory, a1 = 0 ∈ S or a2 = 0 ∈ S,
hence [a1] = [0] or [a2] = [0]. This is a contradiction, as U1 and U2 are
ultrafilters. Thus, (U1, U2) ∈ R
0
[1R)
.
(2) By the previous item, (U1, U2) ∈ R
0
[1R)
. By Lemma 4.12, there is a V ∈ UltR
such that (U1, U2) ∈ R
0
V .
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For each pair (U1, U2) ∈ UltS
2 we choose one V ∈ UltR, such that (U1, U2) ∈
R0V , and denote it by VU1,U2 .
The canonical model M = (W,R, v) corresponding to S is defined as follows:
The domain is W = UltS × UltR. If x ∈ W , we denote by x1 and x2 its first and
second component respectively. For each p ∈ VS we define
v(p) =
{
x ∈W
∣∣ [p] ∈ x1} .
It is easy to check that for all set terms a we have v(a) =
{
x ∈W
∣∣ [a] ∈ x1}. For
each V ∈ UltR we define a relation RV ⊆W
2:
RV =
{
(x, y) ∈W 2
∣∣∣ ((x1, y1) ∈ R0y2 ∧ V = y2)
∨
(
(x1, y1) /∈ R
0
y2
∧ V = Vx1,y1
)}
.
That is, if there should be a pair
(
(x1, ), (y1, )
)
3 inRV , we put all pairs
(
(x1, ), (y1, V )
)
there; ifRV should not contain a pair
(
(x1, ), (y1, )
)
, we put all pairs
(
(x1, ), (y1, V )
)
in RVx1,y1 .
This simple construction suffices to prove the completeness of the proof system
without (A−1) and (RS) for the language without −1.
When we include the symbol −1, however, we need something more sophisti-
cated. The problem is that we should ensure that RV1 ∩RV2 = ∅ for V1 6= V2 while
at the same time preserving the property stated in the following lemma:
Lemma 4.14. If V ⊆ ClR, then R
0
V −1
=
(
R0V
)−1
.
The decision where to put pairs of points should not be made independently
for (x, y) and (y, x). We should have (x, y) ∈ RV ⇔ (y, x) ∈ (RV )
−1. To this end,
we will replace the first disjunct in the above definition of RV with a condition,
in which V does not depend solely on y2, but on a symmetric function of x2 and
y2. To define such a function, we number the elements of UltR with ordinals and
define a symmetric binary operation ⊖ on them. This is Definition 3 below. We
have two different definitions of ⊖ – for finite |UltR| and for infinite |UltR|. We
will denote by Vα the element of UltR numbered with α. We will take the second
component of each point ofW to be the number (ordinal) of a relational ultrafilter
rather than the ultrafilter itself. Let (x, y) ∈W 2 and n = x2 ⊖ y2.
First we consider the case x2 6= y2. If (x1, y1) ∈ R
0
Vn
\ R0
V −1n
, we put (x, y) in
RVn and (y, x) in RV −1n . If (x1, y1) ∈ R
0
V −1n
\R0Vn , we put (x, y) in RV −1n and (y, x)
in RVn . In the case when (x1, y1) ∈ R
0
Vn
∩ R0
V −1n
, we need to choose one of (x, y)
and (y, x) and then put the chosen pair in RVn , while the other one should go to
RV −1n .
If x2 = y2 or (x1, y1) /∈ R
0
Vn
∪ R0
V −1n
, we put the pair (x, y) in the relation
corresponding to some relational ultrafilter Vx1,y1 , which we choose among those
V ∈ UltR for which (x1, y1) ∈ R
0
V . The reason why we treat the case x2 = y2 along
with (x1, y1) /∈ R
0
Vn
∪ R0
V −1n
rather than putting (x, y) in RVn , is that we cannot
guarantee that Vx2⊖x2 is symmetric. But we can choose Vx1,x1 to be symmetric
according to the following proposition:
3The symbol ‘ ’ here denotes an arbitrary element of UltR.
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Proposition 4.15. If U ∈ UltS, then:
(1) (U,U) ∈ R0V ⇔
(
∀[α] ∈ V
)(
∀[a] ∈ U
)(
∃∃(a, a)[α] ∈ S
)
.
(2) There exists a symmetric V ∈ UltR such that (U,U) ∈ R
0
V .
Proof. See Appendix B.
Definition 3. Let κ =
∣∣UltR∣∣. We consider two cases for κ:
(1) κ < ω. Let UltR =
{
Vi
∣∣ 1 ≤ i ≤ κ} with (i 6= j ⇒ Vi 6= Vj). We denote
Rw = {0, 1, . . . , 2κ}. For m,n ∈ Rw we define
m⊕ n = (m+ n) mod (2κ + 1)
m⊖ n = min
(
(m− n) mod (2κ+ 1), (n −m) mod (2κ+ 1)
)
.
We have 0 ≤ m⊖ n = n⊖m ≤ κ for all m,n ∈ Rw. Also, (m⊕ n)⊖m = n
for arbitrary m ∈ Rw and 1 ≤ n ≤ κ. We define an irreflexive relation ⋖ on
Rw
m⋖ n⇔ (n−m) mod (2κ + 1) < (m− n) mod (2κ+ 1) ,
such that for all different m,n ∈ Rw either m ⋖ n, or n ⋖ m. We have
m⋖m⊕ n for arbitrary m ∈ Rw and 1 ≤ n ≤ κ.
(2) κ ≥ ω. Let UltR =
{
Vα
∣∣ 0 < α < κ} with (α 6= β ⇒ Vα 6= Vβ). We denote
Rw = κ. For α, β ∈ Rw we define α⊕ β = α+ β
4 and
α⊖ β =
{
α− β if β < α,
β − α otherwise.
Again, we have µ ⊖ ν = ν ⊖ µ for all µ, ν ∈ Rw, and (µ ⊕ ν) ⊖ µ = ν for
arbitrary µ ∈ Rw and 0 < ν < κ. As in the previous case, we define a
relation ⋖ on Rw, which in this case is just the usual strict total order:
µ⋖ ν ⇔ µ < ν .
We have µ⋖ µ⊕ ν for arbitrary µ ∈ Rw and 0 < ν < κ.
The domain of the canonical model is W = UltS × Rw.
For each p ∈ VS we define v(p) =
{
x ∈W
∣∣ [p] ∈ x1}.
We choose a set
(
Ult2S
)
0
⊆ UltS
2 such that for each (U1, U2) ∈ UltS
2 it contains
exactly one x ∈
{
(U1, U2), (U2, U1)
}
.
For each pair (U1, U2) ∈ UltS
2 we choose one V ∈ UltR, such that
(U1, U2) ∈ R
0
V ∧ (U1 = U2 ⇒ V = V
−1) ,
and denote it by VU1,U2 .
4Here ‘+’ denotes ordinal addition. If β < α, we denote by α− β the unique ordinal γ such
that β + γ = α.
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For each V ∈ UltR we define a relation RV ⊆W
2:
RV =
{
(x, y) ∈W 2
∣∣∣∣∣
(
x2 6= y2 ∧ (x1, y1) ∈ R
0
Vx2⊖y2
∩R0
V −1x2⊖y2
∧
((
x2 ⋖ y2 ∧ V = Vx2⊖y2
)
∨
(
y2 ⋖ x2 ∧ V = V
−1
x2⊖y2
)))
∨
(
x2 6= y2 ∧ (x1, y1) ∈ R
0
Vx2⊖y2
\R0
V −1x2⊖y2
∧ V = Vx2⊖y2
)
∨
(
x2 6= y2 ∧ (x1, y1) ∈ R
0
V −1x2⊖y2
\R0Vx2⊖y2
∧ V = V −1x2⊖y2
)
∨
((
x2 = y2 ∨ (x1, y1) /∈ R
0
Vx2⊖y2
∪R0
V −1x2⊖y2
)
∧
((
(x1, y1) ∈
(
Ult2S
)
0
∧ V = Vx1,y1
)
∨
(
(y1, x1) ∈
(
Ult2S
)
0
∧ V = V −1y1,x1
)))}
.
Lemma 4.16. (1)
⋃{
RV
∣∣ V ∈ UltR} =W 2.
(2) V ′ 6= V ′′ implies RV ′ ∩RV ′′ = ∅.
(3) RV −1 =
(
RV
)−1
;
(4) (x, y) ∈ RV implies (x1, y1) ∈ R
0
V ;
(5) If (U1, U2) ∈ R
0
Vν
, then for each µ ∈ Rw it holds that(
(U1, µ), (U2, µ⊕ ν)
)
∈ RVν .
Proof. The first four items may be easily verified by considering the four cases in
the definition. We prove the last one. Let (U1, U2) ∈ R
0
Vν
and µ ∈ Rw. Note that
µ⋖ µ⊕ ν and hence µ 6= µ⊕ ν. Consider the pair
(
(U1, µ), (U2, µ⊕ ν)
)
. We have
(µ⊕ ν)⊖ µ = µ⊖ (µ⊕ ν) = ν. There are two possibilities:
• (U1, U2) ∈ R
0
Vν
∩R0
V −1ν
. As µ⋖ µ⊕ ν, we have
(
(U1, µ), (U2, µ ⊕ ν)
)
∈ RVν .
• (U1, U2) ∈ R
0
Vν
\R0
V −1ν
. Then
(
(U1, µ), (U2, µ⊕ ν)
)
∈ RVν .
For each α ∈ VR we define R(α) =
⋃{
RV
∣∣ V ∈ UltR ∧ [α] ∈ V }.
Lemma 4.17. For each term α ∈ TRel(VR)
R(α) =
⋃{
RV
∣∣ V ∈ UltR ∧ [α] ∈ V } .
Proof. For each (x, y) ∈W 2 we denote by V (x, y) the unique V ∈ UltR such that
(x, y) ∈ RV . We need to prove that
R(α) =
{
(x, y) ∈W 2
∣∣ [α] ∈ V (x, y)} .
This can be proved by structural induction on α.
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Notation. For a ∈ TSet(VS) we denote h(a) =
{
U ∈ UltS
∣∣ [a] ∈ U}.
For α ∈ TRel(VR) we denote h(α) =
{
V ∈ UltR
∣∣ [α] ∈ V }.
Lemma 4.18. If a, b ∈ TSet(VS) and α ∈ TRel(VR), then:
∀∃(a, b)[α] ∈ S ⇔
(
∀U ∈ h(a)
)(
∀[c] ∈ U
)(
∃∃(c, b)[α] ∈ S
)
.
Proof. (→) Let ∀∃(a, b)[α] ∈ S, U ∈ h(a) and [c] ∈ U . Then a ∩ c 6= 0 ∈ S. By
(AL1), ∃∃(c, b)[α] ∈ S.
(←) Assume that ∀∃(a, b)[α] /∈ S. Since S is a rich theory, there is a set
variable p such that a ∩ p = 0 ∨ ∃∃(p, b)[α] /∈ S. Hence a ∩ p = 0 /∈ S and
∃∃(p, b)[α] /∈ S. Then [a] ∩ [p] 6= [0] and there is an ultrafilter U ⊇
{
[a], [p]
}
.
Lemma 4.19. For each formula ϕ ∈ Form(VS,VR) the following equivalence
holds: ϕ ∈ S ⇔M  ϕ.
Proof. The proof is by induction on the structure of ϕ. Since S is a maximal
theory, we need to consider explicitly only the cases where ϕ is an atomic formula.
(1) ϕ is a1 ≤ a2. By the Stone representation theorem for Boolean algebras,
a1 ≤ a2 ∈ S ⇔ h(a1) ⊆ h(a2)
⇔ v(a1) = h(a1)× Rw ⊆ h(a2)× Rw = v(a2) .
(2) ϕ is ∃∃(a1, a2)[α].
(→) Let ∃∃(a1, a2)[α] ∈ S. Then
(
[a1), [a2)
)
∈ R0[α). By Lemma 4.12(
∃U1 ∈ h(a1)
)(
∃U2 ∈ h(a2)
)(
∃V ∈ h(α)
)(
(U1, U2) ∈ R
0
V
)
.
Let V = Vµ. Then (U1, 0) ∈ v(a1), (U2, µ) ∈ v(a2) and RV ⊆ R(α).
By item 5 in Lemma 4.16,
(
(U1, 0), (U2, µ)
)
∈ RV . This shows that M 
∃∃(a1, a2)[α].
(←) Let M  ∃∃(a1, a2)[α]. Then(
∃x ∈ v(a1)
)(
∃y ∈ v(a2)
)(
∃V ∈ h(α)
)(
(x, y) ∈ RV
)
.
Thus, we have [a1] ∈ x1, [a2] ∈ y1, [α] ∈ V , and item 4 in Lemma 4.16 gives
us (x1, y1) ∈ R
0
V . Hence ∃∃(a1, a2)[α] ∈ S.
(3) ϕ is ∀∀(a1, a2)[α].
∀∀(a1, a2)[α] ∈ S ⇔ ¬∃∃(a1, a2)[−α] ∈ S
⇔ ∃∃(a1, a2)[−α] /∈ S ⇔M 2 ∃∃(a1, a2)[−α]
⇔M  ∀∀(a1, a2)[α]
(4) ϕ is ∀∃(a1, a2)[α].
(→) Let ∀∃(a1, a2)[α] ∈ S. By Lemma 4.18(
∀U1 ∈ h(a1)
)(
∀[c] ∈ U1
)(
∃∃(c, a2)[α] ∈ S
)
.
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Hence
(
∀U1 ∈ h(a1)
)((
U1, [a2)
)
∈ R0[α)
)
. By Lemma 4.12
(
∀U1 ∈ h(a1)
)(
∃U2 ∈ h(a2)
)(
∃V ∈ h(α)
)(
(U1, U2) ∈ R
0
V
)
.
By item 5 in Lemma 4.16,
(
∀U1 ∈ h(a1)
)(
∃U2 ∈ h(a2)
)(
∃ν ∈ Rw
)(
∀µ ∈ Rw
)
((
(U1, µ), (U2, µ⊕ ν)
)
∈ RVν ∧ Vν ∈ h(α)
)
and hence
(
∀U1 ∈ h(a1)
)(
∀µ ∈ Rw
)(
∃U2 ∈ h(a2)
)(
∃ν ∈ Rw
)
((
(U1, µ), (U2, µ ⊕ ν)
)
∈ R(α)
)
Therefore
(
∀x ∈ v(a1)
)(
∃y ∈ v(a2)
)(
(x, y) ∈ R(α)
)
.
(←) Assume that M  ∀∃(a1, a2)[α]. Then(
∀x ∈ v(a1)
)(
∃y ∈ v(a2)
)(
∃V ∈ h(α)
)(
(x, y) ∈ RV
)
.
By item 4 in Lemma 4.16,(
∀x ∈ v(a1)
)(
∃y ∈ v(a2)
)(
∃V ∈ h(α)
)(
(x1, y1) ∈ R
0
V
)
.
As Rw 6= ∅,(
∀U1 ∈ h(a1)
)(
∃U2 ∈ h(a2)
)(
∃V ∈ h(α)
)(
(U1, U2) ∈ R
0
V
)
.
Hence (
∀U1 ∈ h(a1)
)(
∀[c] ∈ U1
)(
∃∃(c, a2)[α] ∈ S
)
.
Then, by Lemma 4.18 we obtain ∀∃(a1, a2)[α] ∈ S.
(5) ϕ is ∃∀(a1, a2)[α].
∃∀(a1, a2)[α] ∈ S ⇔ ¬∀∃(a1, a2)[−α] ∈ S
⇔ ∀∃(a1, a2)[−α] /∈ S ⇔M 2 ∀∃(a1, a2)[−α]
⇔M  ∃∀(a1, a2)[α]
Theorem 4.20 (Completeness). If Γ ⊆ Form(VS,VR), then
Γ is consistent⇔ Γ has a model .
Proof. (→) Let Γ be a consistent set of formulas. By item 2 in Corollary 4.5 there
is a maximal theory S which contains Γ. S has a model which is also a model of
Γ.
(←) LetM  Γ and let ∆ =
{
ϕ ∈ Form(VS,VR)
∣∣M  ϕ}. By Proposition 3.1
we have Thm(VS,VR) ⊆ ∆. As (MP ) preserves the truth in every model, the set
∆ is closed under (MP ). Since M 2 ⊥, ⊥ /∈ ∆. Hence Γ ⊆ ∆ is consistent.
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5 Complexity
Before we consider the complexity of the satisfiability problem, we first note that
our logic is a fragment of Boolean Modal Logic (BML)[5, 7] extended with a
symbol ‘−1’ for the converse of the accessibility relation.
BML is a multimodal logic, whose language contains two types of variables
– a set of relational variables (atomic modal parameters) and an infinite set of
propositional variables. The set of modal parameters consists of the set of re-
lational variables, the relational constant 1 and all their Boolean combinations.
The set of formulas is the smallest set which contains the propositional variables
and is closed under prefixing a formula by a box or diamond modality as well as
connecting formulas with the propositional operators.
A model for BML is a triple M = (W,R, v), where W 6= ∅ is the domain, R is
a function, which assigns to each atomic modal parameter a relation on W , and v
assigns to each propositional variable a subset of W . R is extended to all modal
parameters according to the standard interpretation of the Boolean operators as
set intersection, union and complement, interpreting 1 as the universal relation
W 2. We have the standard meaning of the modal operators:
(M,x)  〈α〉ϕ⇔ (∃y ∈W )
(
(x, y) ∈ R(α) ∧ (M,y)  ϕ
)
(M,x)  [α]ϕ⇔ (∀y ∈W )
(
(x, y) ∈ R(α)⇒ (M,y)  ϕ
)
.
We consider the extension of the language of BML with a symbol ‘−1’ in modal
parameters. We interpret it as taking the converse of the relation: R(α−1) =(
R(α)
)−1
. The formulas of our language have equivalents in this extension of the
language of BML:
a ≤ b is equivalent to [1](a→ b)
∃∃(a, b)[α] is equivalent to 〈1〉
(
a ∧ 〈α〉b
)
∀∃(a, b)[α] is equivalent to [1]
(
a→ 〈α〉b
)
∀∀(a, b)[α] is equivalent to [1]
(
a→ [−α]¬b
)
∃∀(a, b)[α] is equivalent to 〈1〉
(
a ∧ [−α]¬b
)
.
The satisfiability problem for our logic is decidable in NExpTime, since the
formulas are translatable (in polynomial time) into the NExpTime-decidable two-
variable fragment of first-order predicate logic. We argue that the complexity is
the same as the complexity of BML, which is proved by Lutz and Sattler [14] to
be NExpTime if the language contains an infinite number of relational variables,
and ExpTime if only a finite number of relational variables is available. Also, the
complexity does not depend on whether we allow −1 in the language.
In the case of an infinite number of relational variables, the lower NExpTime
bound is proved in [14] by a reduction from an NExpTime-complete tiling problem.
The BML formula, used to encode the tiling, is a conjunction of a formula, which
describes the initial condition for the problem, and several conjuncts, which ensure
that every model satisfying the formula is indeed a tiling. All conjuncts but the
one for the initial condition can be translated into our fragment. The formula for
the initial condition can be replaced by a formula from our fragment, such that
the whole conjunction is equisatisfiable with the original one.
In the case of a finite number of relational variables, the lower ExpTime bound
of BML follows from the ExpTime-completeness of Ku (the basic modal logic
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enriched with the universal modality). However, the intersection of Ku with our
fragment is also ExpTime-hard, hence the ExpTime-hardness of our logic.
The upper ExpTime bound for BML is proved in [14] by reduction to the
satisfiability problem for the basic multimodal logic enriched with the universal
modality. The same reduction is applicable in the presence of −1, and multimodal
Ku enriched with
−1 is also ExpTime-complete.
These high complexities are due to the presence of ∀∃ and ∃∀ in the language.
If we remove these symbols from the language, the resulting logic has an NP-
complete satisfiability problem, as it possesses the polysize model property. This
can be proved by selection of points from a model in the way it is done in [2] for
the dynamic logics of the region-based theory of discrete spaces.
6 Concluding remarks
The first completeness proof for a non-classical relational syllogistic (i.e. one that
contains relational terms) was given by Nishihara, Morita, and Iwata in [22]. Their
fragment contains variables for proper nouns and n-ary relational terms closed only
under complementation and does not allow Boolean operations on set terms.
Later works on relational syllogistics, devoted mainly to the computational
complexity problems, are McAllester and Givan [15] and Pratt-Hartmann [26, 27,
28, 30]. The paper by Moss and Pratt-Hartmann [31] is devoted both to complete
axiomatizations and some computational complexity results. A successor of [31]
is Moss [21], devoted to axiomatizations and completeness proofs for a number of
relational syllogistics.
Our logic differs in expressiveness from all systems of relational syllogistic
mentioned above. One of the reasons is that we have quite rich language based on
both class terms and relational terms, while the other logics are based on languages
that are weaker than our system, or incomparable with it, some of them dealing
only with atomic formulas. Such is, for instance, the system of McAllester and
Givan [15] and some systems studied in Moss and Pratt-Hartmann [31] and Moss
[21]. The fragment of our language, which contains only two relational terms α
and −α and all set terms are variables or negated variables, coincides with the
language of the system R† studied by Moss and Pratt-Hartmann in [31].
In the present paper we have proved the completeness of a syllogistic logic with
a set of binary relations closed under the Boolean operations and under taking the
converse. The completeness proof can be generalized to the case of n-ary relations
for arbitrary n, which will cover the case of n-transitive verbs. We also plan to
study extensions of our logic with several kinds of nominals making it possible to
cover sentences from natural language like ‘Socrates is a man’, ‘Socrates is mortal’.
The construction of the canonical model in our logic is similar to that for
BML. It is also possible to use the construction of the relations RV from R
0
V to
prove the completeness of BML extended with a symbol −1 for the converse of the
accessibility relation.
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A Proof of Proposition 4.6
In the proof of Proposition 4.6 we will need the following lemmas.
If Q is a quantifier, we will denote by Q the dual quantifier.
Lemma A.1. Let a and b be set terms and let α be a relational term. Then, for
arbitrary quantifiers Q1 and Q2 the formula
Q1Q2(a, b)[−α]↔ ¬Q1Q2(a, b)[α]
is a theorem.
Proof. One of these four formulas is an axiom. It remains to prove 6 implications.
In the following proofs p and q are different set variables, which do not occur in
the terms a and b. We know that such variables exist, since VS is infinite.
(1) ⊢∀∃(a, b)[α]→ a ∩ p = 0 ∨ ∃∃(p, b)[α] by (AL1)
⊢∀∃(a, b)[α]→ a ∩ p = 0 ∨ ¬∀∀(p, b)[−α] by (A−)
⊢∀∃(a, b)[α]→ ¬∃∀(a, b)[−α] by (R3)
(2) ⊢¬∃∀(a, b)[−α]→ a ∩ p = 0 ∨ ¬∀∀(p, b)[−α] by (AL3)
⊢¬∃∀(a, b)[−α]→ a ∩ p = 0 ∨ ∃∃(p, b)[α] by (A−)
⊢¬∃∀(a, b)[−α]→ ∀∃(a, b)[α] by (R1)
(3) ⊢¬∃∃(a, b)[−α]→ a ∩ p = 0 ∨ ¬∀∃(p, b)[−α] by (AL1)
⊢¬∃∃(a, b)[−α]
→ a ∩ p = 0 ∨ b ∩ q = 0 ∨ ¬∀∀(p, q)[−α] by (AL2)
⊢¬∃∃(a, b)[−α]→ a ∩ p = 0 ∨ b ∩ q = 0 ∨ ∃∃(p, q)[α] by (A−)
⊢¬∃∃(a, b)[−α]→ b ∩ q = 0 ∨ ∀∃(a, q)[α] by (R1)
⊢¬∃∃(a, b)[−α]→ ∀∀(a, b)[α] by (R2)
(4) ⊢¬∃∀(a, b)[α]→ a ∩ p = 0 ∨ ¬∀∀(p, b)[α] by (AL3)
⊢¬∃∀(a, b)[α]→ a ∩ p = 0 ∨ ∃∃(p, b)[−α] by item 3
⊢¬∃∀(a, b)[α]→ ∀∃(a, b)[−α] by (R1)
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(5) ⊢∀∀(a, b)[α]→ b ∩ p = 0 ∨ ∀∃(a, p)[α] by (AL2)
⊢∀∀(a, b)[α]→ b ∩ p = 0 ∨ ¬∃∀(a, p)[−α] by item 1
⊢∀∀(a, b)[α]→ b ∩ p = 0 ∨ ∀∃(a, p)[−− α] by item 4
⊢∀∀(a, b)[α]→ ∀∀(a, b)[− − α] by (R2)
⊢∀∀(a, b)[α]→ ¬∃∃(a, b)[−α] by (A−)
(6) ⊢∀∃(a, b)[−α]→ a ∩ p = 0 ∨ ∃∃(p, b)[−α] by (AL1)
⊢∀∃(a, b)[−α]→ a ∩ p = 0 ∨ ¬∀∀(p, b)[α] by item 5
⊢∀∃(a, b)[−α]→ ¬∃∀(a, b)[α] by (R3)
Lemma A.2. Let α, β ∈ TRel(VR) and let B = TSet(VS). Then the following
conditions are equivalent:
(1) (∀a, b ∈ B)
(
∃∃(a, b)[α]→ ∃∃(a, b)[β] ∈ S
)
(2) (∀a, b ∈ B)
(
∀∃(a, b)[α]→ ∀∃(a, b)[β] ∈ S
)
(3) (∀a, b ∈ B)
(
∀∀(a, b)[α]→ ∀∀(a, b)[β] ∈ S
)
(4) (∀a, b ∈ B)
(
∃∀(a, b)[α]→ ∃∀(a, b)[β] ∈ S
)
Proof. We will prove (1)→(2). Assume that item 1 is true and suppose that there
are set terms a and b such that ∀∃(a, b)[α] → ∀∃(a, b)[β] /∈ S. Since S is a rich
theory, there is a set variable p such that
∀∃(a, b)[α]→ a ∩ p = 0 ∨ ∃∃(p, b)[β] /∈ S .
Hence ∀∃(a, b)[α]→ a ∩ p = 0 ∨ ∃∃(p, b)[α] /∈ S.
This is a contradiction, since the last formula is a theorem.
(2)→(3) The proof is analogous to the previous one.
(3)→(4) Assume that item 3 is true. By Lemma A.1
(∀a, b ∈ B)
(
¬∃∃(a, b)[−α]→ ¬∃∃(a, b)[−β] ∈ S
)
.
For the sake of contradiction suppose that there are set terms a and b such that
∀∃(a, b)[−β]→ ∀∃(a, b)[−α] /∈ S .
Since S is a rich theory, there is a set variable p such that
∀∃(a, b)[−β]→ a ∩ p = 0 ∨ ∃∃(p, b)[−α] /∈ S .
Hence
∀∃(a, b)[−β]→ a ∩ p = 0 ∨ ∃∃(p, b)[−β] /∈ S .
This is a contradiction, since the last formula is a theorem. Hence
(∀a, b ∈ B)
(
∀∃(a, b)[−β]→ ∀∃(a, b)[−α] ∈ S
)
.
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Using Lemma A.1 again, we conclude that
(∀a, b ∈ B)
(
¬∃∀(a, b)[β]→ ¬∃∀(a, b)[α] ∈ S
)
,
which implies item 4.
(4)→(1) The proof is analogous to the previous one.
Lemma A.3. If a, b, c, d are set terms and α, β are relational terms, then the
following formulas are theorems:
(1) ∃∃(a, b)[α] ∧ a ≤ c→ ∃∃(c, b)[α]
and
∃∃(a, b)[α] ∧ b ≤ c→ ∃∃(a, c)[α]
(2) ∀∀(a, b)[α] ∧ c ≤ a→ ∀∀(c, b)[α]
and
∀∀(a, b)[α] ∧ c ≤ b→ ∀∀(a, c)[α]
(3) ∀∀(a, b)[α] ∧ ∀∀(c, d)[β]→ ∀∀(a ∩ c, b ∩ d)[α ∩ β]
(4) ∀∀(a, b)[α] ∧ ¬∃∃(c, d)[α ∩ β]→ ∀∀(a ∩ c, b ∩ d)[−β]
Proof.
(1) We will prove the first one.
⊢∃∃(a, b)[α] ∧ a ≤ c→
(
∃∃(a, b)[α] ∨ ∃∃(c, b)[α]
)
⊢∃∃(a, b)[α] ∧ a ≤ c→ ∃∃(a ∪ c, b)[α] ∧ a ∪ c = c by (A∪1 )
⊢∃∃(a, b)[α] ∧ a ≤ c→ ∃∃(c, b)[α] by (A=1 )
(2) Follows from the previous item and Lemma A.1.
(3) ⊢∀∀(a, b)[α] ∧ ∀∀(c, d)[β]
→ ∀∀(a ∩ c, b ∩ d)[α] ∧ ∀∀(a ∩ c, b ∩ d)[β] by item 2
⊢∀∀(a, b)[α] ∧ ∀∀(c, d)[β]→ ∀∀(a ∩ c, b ∩ d)[α ∩ β] by (A∩)
(4) We will prove item 4. Let p and q be different set variables which do not
occur in a, b, c and d.
⊢∀∀(a, b)[α] ∧ ¬∃∃(c, d)[α ∩ β] ∧ ∀∀(p, q)[β]
→ ∀∀(a ∩ p, b ∩ q)[α ∩ β] ∧ ¬∃∃(c, d)[α ∩ β] by item 3
⊢∀∀(a, b)[α] ∧ ¬∃∃(c, d)[α ∩ β] ∧ ∀∀(p, q)[β]
→ a ∩ p ∩ c = 0 ∨ b ∩ q ∩ d = 0 by (AL1) and (AL2)
⊢∀∀(a, b)[α] ∧ ¬∃∃(c, d)[α ∩ β]
→ a ∩ c ∩ p = 0 ∨ b ∩ d ∩ q = 0 ∨ ¬∀∀(p, q)[β]
⊢∀∀(a, b)[α] ∧ ¬∃∃(c, d)[α ∩ β]
→ a ∩ c ∩ p = 0 ∨ b ∩ d ∩ q = 0 ∨ ∃∃(p, q)[−β] by Lemma A.1
⊢∀∀(a, b)[α] ∧ ¬∃∃(c, d)[α ∩ β]
→ b ∩ d ∩ q = 0 ∨ ∀∃(a ∩ c, q)[−β] by (R1)
⊢∀∀(a, b)[α] ∧ ¬∃∃(c, d)[α ∩ β]
→ ∀∀(a ∩ c, b ∩ d)[−β] by (R2)
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Proof of Proposition 4.6. The well-definition of ≤ is obvious. The well-
definition of ∪ follows from (A∪). The well-definition of ∩ and − follows from
(A∩), (A−), Lemma A.1 and Lemma A.2. The well-definition of −1 follows from
(A−1).
We need to verify the following properties for arbitrary relational terms α, β
and γ:
(1) α 4 α, (α 4 β ∧ β 4 γ)⇒ α 4 γ, (α 4 β ∧ β 4 α)⇒ α ≈ β
(2) α ∩ β 4 α, α ∩ β 4 β, (γ 4 α ∧ γ 4 β)⇒ γ 4 α ∩ β
(3) α 4 α ∪ β, β 4 α ∪ β, (α 4 γ ∧ β 4 γ)⇒ α ∪ β 4 γ
(4) 0R 4 α, α 4 1R
(5) α ∩ (β ∪ γ) 4 (α ∩ β) ∪ (α ∩ γ)
(6) α ∩ −α 4 0R
(7) 1R 4 α ∪ −α
(1) follows directly from the definition of the relation 4. (2) follows from (A∩).
(3) follows analogously from (A∪). (4) follows from (A0R) and (A1R). We will
prove the remaining three theorems. Let a, b ∈ TSet(VS).
(5) We will make use of item 4 in Lemma A.3. Let p, q ∈ VS, p 6= q and
{p, q} ∩VSet(a, b) = ∅.
⊢∀∀(a, b)
[
α ∩ (β ∪ γ)
]
∧ ¬∃∃(p, q)
[
(α ∩ β) ∪ (α ∩ γ)
]
→ ∀∀(a, b)[α] ∧ ∀∀(a, b)[β ∪ γ] ∧ ¬∃∃(p, q)[α ∩ β]
∧ ¬∃∃(p, q)[α ∩ γ] by (A∩) and (A∪)
⊢∀∀(a, b)
[
α ∩ (β ∪ γ)
]
∧ ¬∃∃(p, q)
[
(α ∩ β) ∪ (α ∩ γ)
]
→ ∀∀(a, b)[β ∪ γ] ∧ ∀∀(a ∩ p, b ∩ q)[−β]
∧ ∀∀(a ∩ p, b ∩ q)[−γ] by Lemma A.3
⊢∀∀(a, b)
[
α ∩ (β ∪ γ)
]
∧ ¬∃∃(p, q)
[
(α ∩ β) ∪ (α ∩ γ)
]
→ ∀∀(a, b)[β ∪ γ] ∧ ¬∃∃(a ∩ p, b ∩ q)[β]
∧ ¬∃∃(a ∩ p, b ∩ q)[γ] by (A−)
⊢∀∀(a, b)
[
α ∩ (β ∪ γ)
]
∧ ¬∃∃(p, q)
[
(α ∩ β) ∪ (α ∩ γ)
]
→ ∀∀(a, b)[β ∪ γ] ∧ ¬∃∃(a ∩ p, b ∩ q)[β ∪ γ] by (A∪)
⊢∀∀(a, b)
[
α ∩ (β ∪ γ)
]
∧ ¬∃∃(p, q)
[
(α ∩ β) ∪ (α ∩ γ)
]
→ a ∩ p = 0 ∨ b ∩ q = 0 by (AL1) and (AL2)
⊢∀∀(a, b)
[
α ∩ (β ∪ γ)
]
→ a ∩ p = 0 ∨ b ∩ q = 0
∨ ∃∃(p, q)
[
(α ∩ β) ∪ (α ∩ γ)
]
⊢∀∀(a, b)
[
α ∩ (β ∪ γ)
]
→ b ∩ q = 0 ∨ ∀∃(a, q)
[
(α ∩ β) ∪ (α ∩ γ)
]
by (R1)
⊢∀∀(a, b)
[
α ∩ (β ∪ γ)
]
→ ∀∀(a, b)
[
(α ∩ β) ∪ (α ∩ γ)
]
by (R2)
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(6) ⊢∀∀(a, b)[α ∩ −α]
→ ∀∀(a, b)[α] ∧ ∀∀(a, b)[−α] by (A∩)
⊢∀∀(a, b)[α ∩ −α]
→ ∀∀(a, b)[α] ∧ ¬∃∃(a, b)[α] by (A−)
⊢∀∀(a, b)[α ∩ −α]→ a = 0 ∨ b = 0 by (AL1) and (AL2)
⊢∀∀(a, b)[α ∩ −α]→ ¬∃∃(a, b)[−0R] by (A0)
⊢∀∀(a, b)[α ∩ −α]→ ∀∀(a, b)[0R] by Lemma A.1
(7) ⊢¬∃∃(a, b)[α ∪−α]
→ ¬∃∃(a, b)[α] ∧ ¬∃∃(a, b)[−α] by (A∪)
⊢¬∃∃(a, b)[α ∪−α]
→ ¬∃∃(a, b)[α] ∧ ∀∀(a, b)[α] by Lemma A.1
⊢¬∃∃(a, b)[α ∪−α]→ a = 0 ∨ b = 0 by (AL1) and (AL2)
⊢¬∃∃(a, b)[α ∪−α]→ ¬∃∃(a, b)[1R] by (A0)
⊢∃∃(a, b)[1R]→ ∃∃(a, b)[α ∪ −α]
The equivalence α 4 β ⇔ α ∪ β ≈ β follows from (A∪).
B Proof of Proposition 4.15
(1) This is obvious and is used only to shorten the notation.
(2) Let
I =
{
[α] ∈ ClR
∣∣∣ α ≈ α−1 ∧ (∃[a] ∈ U)(∃∃(a, a)[α] /∈ S)}
F =
{
[α] ∈ ClR
∣∣∣ α ≈ α−1 and there exists a non-empty
finite set {α1, α2, . . . , αk} ⊆ TRel, such that
(α−11 ∪−α1) ∩ · · · ∩ (α
−1
k ∪−αk) 4 α
}
The set I is an ideal in the Boolean algebra of symmetric classes of relational
terms. By Lemma 4.10, F is a filter in that algebra and F ∩ I = ∅.
By the separation theorem for filter-ideal pairs, there exists an ultrafilter
F ′ ⊇ F in the Boolean algebra of symmetric classes of relational terms, such
that F ′ ∩ I = ∅. Let V =
{
x ∈ ClR
∣∣ x−1 ∩ x ∈ F ′}. V has the following
properties:
• V ∈ UltR. We need to check the following:
(a) [1R] ∈ V .
(b) If x ∈ V , y ∈ ClR, and x ≤ y, then y ∈ V .
(c) If x, y ∈ V , then x ∩ y ∈ V .
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(d) If x ∈ ClR, then either x ∈ V , or −x ∈ V . Suppose otherwise.
Then x−1 ∩ x /∈ F ′ and (−x−1) ∩ −x /∈ F ′. Hence(
x−1 ∩ x
)
∪
(
(−x−1) ∩ (−x)
)
=
(
x−1 ∪ −x
)
∩
(
(−x−1) ∪ x
)
/∈ F ′ ,
which contradicts F ⊆ F ′.
(e) [0R] /∈ V .
• V = V −1.
• (U,U) ∈ R0V . Since F
′ ∩ I = ∅, we have(
∀[α] ∈ V
)(
∀[a] ∈ U
)(
∃∃(a, a)
[
α ∩ α−1
]
∈ S
)
and hence (U,U) ∈ R0V .
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